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Abstract 
百1ispaper is concerned with the dilemma facing a politician choosing between 
reducing unemployment and improvmg/preservmg the quality level of the environ 
ment. A simple dynamic model for a state with a backward looking short-lived memory 
is presented 
Keywords Environmenl, Unemploymenl, Dynamic Optimization: Polllica/ Business 
Cycle 
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I. Introduction 
百1epaper studies a dynamic optimal choice in a political system In particular, a 
politician's chmce for reducing unemployment and improving and/or preserving the 
quality level of the environment JS discussed when the p叫iticianor h凶 herpolitical 
party in power wants to win at the next election in an environmentally conscious 
state with a backward looking short-hved memory. 
We often observe that the public tends to believe that there is a 回 deoff between 
reducing unemployment and preserving the quality level of the environment. For 
example, see the February 1994 National Geographic magazine. This issue covered 
people in a small town in Idaho who believed that there was a trade-off rela11onsh1p 
between reducing unemployment and preserving the quality level of environment 
and argued that the forest should be developed for the sake of reducing the high local 
unemployment level. And according to the Hotelling Downs model, the politician is 
assumed to maximize the probability of reelection rather than the public interest [see 
Lane(l993). pp 81 82]. Therefore，児gardlesswhether reducing unemployment and 
prese刊 mgthe quality of the environment has truly a negative dynamic relation man 
economy, the problem is that the politician's choice to gain popularity will be subject 
to public belief. 
The problem of policy chmces m the framework of the Hotellmg-Downs model 
was first discussed by Nordhaus (1975). Nordhaus investigated a dynamic optimal 
decision between unemployment and inflation for an incumbent political party in 
order to win popularity. 
The Nordhaus' model can be also applied to many economic policy choice prob-
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!ems. However, it is rare to see economic literatures cons1denng a tradeoff relation-
ship between reducing unemployment and improving/preserving the quality level of 
the environment, which we often日ndm actual policy-makmg practice In this paper 
we consider a problem of pohcy ch01ces between reducmg unemployment and im-
provmg/preserving the quahty level of the environment. In the next section, we ap-
ply Nordhaus’model after some generalizations for our problem of ch01ce between 
unemployment and environment.τ百epaper 1s concluded in Section 3. 
2. A Dynamic Choice Model 
A politician in an incumbent paロywill pursue pohc1es that appeal to as many 
voters as possible so that the party can retain control of government at the next elec 
ti on 
Suppose a politician (or a political party) gain control of government or congress 
through election at time t~O, and the next election will be held at t~T period. Suppose 
that the politician choose ooly one fixed policy which will affect an electoral period 
from 0 to T. This policy will not spil over into the next electoral period. Voters are 
assumed to have a short-lived memory: myopic and backward-looking Therefore, 
the later events from the beginning of the electoral penod will be weighted more 
heavily over the given electoral period. Note that this weighting scheme is very diι 
自erentfrom the conventional forward lookmg weights often used for economic deci-
sions. Nordhaus (1975) employed this backward lookmg weight While Nordhaus 
assumed in his model a linear vote function with respect to m日at1on,the voter's 
p児島rencefunction 1s generalized in our model so that 1t 1s quadratic with respect to 
a proxy of unemployment level (y) and the shortfall of the quality level of environ-
ment (D) respectively 
臼People often believe that a tradeoff between reducing unemployment rate and 
preserving the quality level of the environment exISts A politician faced with re,-
election at the next electoral period maximizes the voter's preference function under 
the constraints百1eexpectation of the public the concernmg the quality level of the 
environment a悶 animpo口antfactor for the policy decision. We assume an e,xpected 
augmented version of tradeoff relauon for the level of unemployment and the quality 
level of the environment and we adopt the adaptive expectation hypothesis about 
how expectations for the quality level of the environment are specifically fonmed 
Okun's law suggests that the level of unemployment (U) has a negative relation-
ship with the cuπent income level (Y) and therefore the unemployment level (U) can 
be prox氾的ythe ful employment income （斗lminus the current income level (Y). 
Lety = lンY
Let us assume the following spec1日cvoting function and tradeoff relauon be-
twe叩 theshortfall of the quality level of the environment (D) and a proxy of unem 
ployment level (y). 
川y,D) = ~y2 + ~ho2 
D = (j-ky) + aDe 
百1enthe politician’s problem will be 
subject to 
IT （上y2＋上hD2)e''dtJo 2J 2 
D=(j一旬）＋aoe
De=b(D-D勺
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
whe日 y＝η一Y,andD =E－今isthe shortfall of current environmen凶 quality
level (£) from the perfect environmental quality level (E/ D' is the expected level 
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e dDe ρ1 
of shortfall in environmental quality and D0三つF Note that De~ b〔D-D勺i
IS equivalent to ee ~ b(E -Ee) r > 0 represents the rate of decaying memory for 
p田tevents百1elevel ofD 1sa function of the level ofy and the expected level ofD(D') 
In the analysis, we assume the political party in power has the ability to 1mple-
ment any target日teof D at any time. We take D’. as a state variable, and D as a 
control variable since D affect y via equation (3). The value of y will be determmed 
when the values ofD and D' are known and it can be viewed as a function of the other 
two variables. 
百1eLagrangian integrand function is 
L寸（y2.+hD2）山 λ1U一旬ー D+aDワ＋λ，（-bD + bD' + D'.) (5) 
where '-t and t.2 are Lagrange multipliers The Euler-Lagrange equations a問
L，一昔L＞＇胃 ye"－ λ1k~O (6) 
La一長L0.-hDe日 l A.,b-0 (7) 
L0，一昔Lo＇－λ1a+A.2b長λ，－o (8) 
Lλ1一昔Lλ1-jー かー D+aD＇－。 (9) 
L, .!L, - bD + bD' +D' ~ 0 
A df A2 
(IO) 
Solvmg the above equations Simultaneously, we arrive at a more explicit form of 
the Euler equation.τbis signs of coeffi口entsof the Euler equation 1s somewhat com-
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plicated To児solvethis difficulty, le内setj=Oanda =I.百1enit reduces to 
D'+rD'+gD＇ ~O目 ）????（
(r-b)bhk' 
whe目 g~一一τ一一－and r, b, k and h > 0.The general solution of this second order 
hk +I 
homogeneous differential equation will be 
D''(I) ~A1e 1’＋ A2e''' (12) 
where 
If r2 > 4g, then the square root has always a positive numerical value and the 
charactenstic roots are real and distinct. In this case, when g < 0, the charactensuc 
roots are 
r1>0,r2<0, 
and when g > 0, the characteristic roots are 
r1<0,r2<0. 
Note g < 0 ifr< b, and g > 0 ifr> b. 
If r2 < 4g, the charactenstic roots will be a paIT of conjugate complex numbers. 
r1,r2~h±vi 
whe陪 h~ずandv」宅三h山吋＇＜4g,
rewritten as 
D＇’（t) ~ e"(A3cosvt + A4sinvt) ( 13) 
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whereA3 =A1 +A2,A4 =A1・A2 Since h 1salways les than zero, the time path 
is convergent over time and it is characterized by damped日uctuat1on.
Assume the initial cond1t1on to be 
D'(O)=D0-A1 +A,>0 (14) 
At the given T, two arbitrary constants can be definitized by usmg the following 
transversality condition・ 
F0,1,_,-o, 
whereF－が＋hD2)e". 
This transversality cond1t1on, after some s1mphfication, can be written as 
fJ'(T) + r,D'(T) -0. (15) 
where ?
? ?
?
??
?
?
?
?? ??」?
羽田equauon (15) together with equation (12) yields 
(r1 + r,)A1e'1' + (r2 + r,)A2e•2T -0. (16) 
百1istransversaiity condition equauon ( 16) simultaneously with the mit1al condi-
tion yields a following definite optimal path for D': 
D＇・（／）-A 1e'1' + A2e'2' (17) 
where A -Di(r2 + r,)e•iT ,-(r1 + i;)e'1r (r2 + i;)e勺f
A －ロ；（r1+ r,)e•1T 
2 (r1 + r,)e'1Tー（r2+r,)e勺T・
6唱
百1erefore,the optimal path for y from equations (3) and ( 4)will be 
y'(t) ~古（r1A1山
What will happen if t ~T? The optimal state of D' at t ~ Twill be 
D''(T) ~ 0 (18) 
Therefore, the optimal environmental policy for a politician in the model is to 
prese刊ethe quality level of the environment to the ceロainextent which the expected 
shortfall in the environmental quality reduces to zero at the terminal time T. 
The optimal state of y（ηwill be: 
If〆＞ 4g, 
y'(T) ~ J戸二石
kb[(11 + i;)e'JTー（r2+ i;)e勺勺’
and if r < 4g, then 
〆（T)- J石士予7
kh[(r1 + i;)e勺T 。＇＋ i;)e勺可
Note al termmal state variables, D''(T) and y(T) are endogenously determined. 
And the constants A1 and A2 depend on r1’r2 and' so that it make us difficult to 
1denlify the corresponding signs. 
One of implications from the above analysis in which when termmal state van-
ables are endogenously determined, the expected shonfall in the environmental qual-
ity has to reduce to zero at the terminal time. To resolve a problem in determining 
signs of constants m the above case, let us modify our model into the oplimization 
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problem with a fixed tenninal state o;.-O. In this new model, a politician wishes 
to reduce the expected shortfall m the quality of the environment to zero. 
Then the optimal path for D' over time will be 
D' "(t) -A 1e'I' + A2e12’ (19) 
whe問
A Doe'2T ,-e;r工721'
A D6e'1T 
，－一一一一一一一一e•iT e•2T 
百1ecoef日口ents,A, and A2 in equation (I 9) a悶 onlydifferent from those of equa 
lion (14). Besides this difference, optimal paths for D', y, and U are the same as the 
aforementioned fixed time case 
The signs of coefficients in this fixed terminal state problem case can be easily 
denved compared to the prev10us fixed time problem and are summarized as fol-
lows 
r' > 4g g>O r1 < 0,r2 < 0 A,< 0,A, > 0 
g<O r1>0,r2<0 
r' < 4g g>O -r±｛有三百
r1, r2 2 A,< 0,A, > 0 
Note A, always takes a positive number while A, is negative, regardless of values 
of r, and r2 
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百1efollowing figu問 showsthe optirr旧lpaths for D' and y. 
Figure I 
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The optimal path for D' starts from D0 = A1 + A2 > 0 and descends tow町dzero at 
t = T Over the electoral penod, the environmental quality level should be improved 
to such an extent that it equal to £1. No削 hatthis D'' is a equidistant function of two 
exponential functions: A,e'• aod A,e" The optimal paths can be either concave or 
convex over time, depending on the two exponential component cu円es
百1eoptimal path for y isa simple inverse function of 6: Equating (3) and (4) gives 
y•(t) ＝古ρ
＝志（r仰川ゆ，e'2').
百1eproxy of unemployment level, y' takes posilive numbers at both m山aland 
terminal pen吋s.And y'(O) is greater than y'(T) when〆＞ 4g. Recall y = Yr Y 
τ'herefore, the unemployment level has to decrease gradu叫lyover an electoral pe-
riod The rate of changes m the shortfall in the quality of the environment and the 
A s;mp o DY""m"5o山加toa Politici a出Domm凶＂＇明 enUncm判oymoorn"dE"'"'""°' 71 
level of unemployment depends on the expectation adjustment coefficient (b), the 
悶 teof decaymg memoηfor past events (r) and the relative weight attached to the 
shoロ向Hm the quality of the environment (h). 
3. Concluding Remarks 
Our model shows that the optimal strategy to max1m1ze popularity is: at the be 
gmning of the electoral period, to raise the expected level of shortfall in the quality of 
the environment and the unemployment level as high as possible and then g目dually
dec問aseboth over the entire electoral penod 
τnis myopic optimal behavior gene四tesa sawtoothed path for the xpected level 
of the environmental quality and the level of unemployment across electoral periods 
Figure 2 
D時（1)
or 
y*(t) 
。
T 2T 3T 
The figu町 2indicates that a politician's myopic optimal behavior could cr田 tea
v1c1ous cycle in the quality level of the environment and the level of unemployment 
under an electoral system in our model 
Two most C四口ala田umptionsin our model to reach this rather pessimistic view 
of a political system are that there are no policy spill”over mto the next electoral 
penod, and a society has a short-lived memory (r > 0). 
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This model implies that to stop the vicious cycle in the quality level of the env1-
ronment and the level of unemployment the electoral system has to be modified so 
that voters can evaluate a politician/paロyaero田 electoralpenods and they have a 
long-lived memory. 
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